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ABSTRACT
In the comparative capitalism literature, the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) ‘one-size-
ﬁts-none’ monetary policy plays a key role in the widening of trade imbalances in the
euro area (EA) by being overly restrictive for the region’s coordinated market
10 economies (CMEs) and overly expansionary for the region’s mixed- D1market economies.
According to this literature, wage setting institutions mediated how the ECB’s
monetary policy affected these economies by re-distributing resources between their
traded and non-traded sectors. In this D2paper, we argue such a one-dimensional focus
on wage setting institutions fails to provide an adequate account of the ECB’s role in
15 the EA trade imbalances and the effects of its monetary policy on traded and non-
traded sectors in the CMEs and MMEQ1 s. By examining three separate transmission
channels of the ECB’s monetary policies (wage and price setting in labor and product
markets; nominal exchange rate of the euro; funding costs and bank credit), this D3paper
goes beyond the traditional emphasis on wage setting institutions and draws
20 attention to those institutions that underpin the non-price competitiveness of traded
sectors: it shows how complementarities between wage setting, innovation and
corporate ﬁnance institutions made traded sectors in the CMEs perfectly ﬁt to and key
beneﬁciaries of the ECB’s monetary policy.
KEYWORDS Monetary policy; ECB; comparative capitalisms; euro crisis; sectoral interests; coordinated market
25 economies; mixed- D4market economies
Introduction
Since mid-2014 the European Central Bank (ECB) embarked on increasingly expan-
sionary monetary policy measures to boost economic growth in the euro area (EA) and
stave off deﬂationary pressures. Almost D52 years later Mario Draghi, president of the
30 ECB, lauded the measures for leading a ‘solid and broad’ recovery in the region. At the
same time, however, the EA’s aggregate current account balance moved towards a huge
surplus that reached 3.4% of its GDP in 2016, suggesting that its recovery has been pre-
dominantly export-led. The EA’s current account surplus follows from the asymmetri-
cal trade adjustment between the surplus and deﬁcit countries in the region: whereas
35 the trade deﬁcits of the peripheral EA countries evaporated since the euro crisis, the
northern EA countries were able to maintain or even increase their surpluses. In this
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D6paper, I will examine the role of the ECB in the widening and subsequent asymmetrical
adjustment of these trade imbalances from a sectoral comparative capitalism (CC) per-
spective: I analyze how its monetary policy contributed to these trade dynamics by
40 affecting the interests of tradable and non-tradable goods and services (‘traded’ and
‘non-traded’ sectors) in different varieties of capitalism (VoC) in the region via three
distinctive transmission mechanisms: (1) wage and price setting in labor and product
markets; (2) capital costs; and (3) the nominal exchange rate of the euro.
The CC literature has primarily focused on the ﬁrst transmission mechanism in its
45 explanation of the EA trade imbalances. Scholars working in the D7VoC D8 tradition have
convincingly argued that traded sectors in the northern EA countries were able to
strengthen their cost competitiveness vis-a-vis those in the southern EA countries:
traded sectors in these ‘coordinated market economies’ (CMEs) beneﬁted from the
presence of wage setting institutions that contained unit labor costs (ULC) in both
50 traded and non-traded sectors. In the southern ‘mixed market economies’ (MMEs), by
contrast, the lack of similar coordinated wage setting institutions led to higher wage
and ULC inﬂation – especially in the non-traded sectors. As a result, traded sectors in
these countries were harmed by higher national inﬂation rates, which undermined their
competitiveness by leading to a real exchange rate appreciation (Hancke, 2013;
55 Johnston, Hancke, & Pant, 2014). The sectoral effects of diverging wage setting institu-
tions were exacerbated by the ECB’s ‘one-size-ﬁts-none’ monetary policy. As the ECB
focuses on region-wide average inﬂation, its monetary policy is generally too restrictive
for countries with lower-than-average inﬂation and too expansionary for countries
with lower-than-average inﬂation. In the pre-crisis years CMEs consequently faced rel-
60 atively high real interest rates that depressed domestic demand and bolstered the com-
petitiveness of their traded sectors by further restraining wage growth; MMEs, on the
other hand, experienced relatively low real interest rates that fueled domestic demand
at the expanse of additional wage inﬂation and declining export competitiveness of
their traded sectors. ECB monetary policy, it is argued, thus played a key role in the
65 widening of EA trade imbalance by reinforcing both the export-led growth models of
the CMEs and the domestic demand-led growth models of the MMEs (Hancke, 2013;
Iversen, Soskice, & Hope, 2016; Johnston & Regan, 2016; Johnston et al., 2014).
In this D9paper, I will show that the VoC literature’s focus on wage setting institutions
fails to provide a sufﬁciently comprehensive and adequate analysis of the sectoral
70 effects of the ECB’s monetary policy and its role in the EA trade imbalances. First, I use
a variety of empirical sources to show that ﬁrms in the traded sectors in CMEs
increased proﬁt margins in response to the relative decline in their ULC instead of low-
ering product prices. This lack of ‘pass-through’ of ULC changes onto product prices
implies that wage restraint and price competitiveness have been less important for the
75 export performance of CME traded sectors than previous analyses in the CC literature
have argued (Baccaro & Benassi, 2017; Hancke, 2013; H€opner & Lutter, 2014; Johnston
et al., 2014). Rather, it is a reﬂection of their strong non-price competitiveness based on
their comparative specialization in the production of quality-differentiated goods,
demand for which is relatively price-inelastic. This does not mean that the relative
80 decline in ULC has been inconsequential for these sectors, however. By drawing atten-
tion to a second transmission mechanism of the ECB’s monetary policy – i.e. its effect
on real interest rates and the capital and funding costs of non-ﬁnancial corporate sec-
tors – I suggest another channel through which the relative decline in ULC assisted
traded sectors in the CMEs: rising proﬁt margins, combined with booming foreign
2 M. VERMEIREN
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85 demand for their goods, bestowed these sectors with ample internal funds to ﬁnance
their investments. This reduced their dependency on external bank funding and made
their investment decisions less vulnerable to the relatively high real interest rates ensu-
ing from the ECB’s single monetary policy: I will show that investment spending by
traded sectors in the CMEs (including both domestic capital formation and foreign
90 direct investment) even increased as a share of GDP.
Second, I highlight the role the euro’s nominal exchange rate in the trade imbalances
and its importance as a monetary policy transmission mechanism. Between 2O02 and
2009 the ECB’s monetary policy contributed to a huge nominal appreciation of the
euro, which drastically undermined the price competitiveness of tradable goods pro-
95 ducers in both CMEs and MMEs vis-a-vis non-Eurozone producers. It is remarkable
that VoC scholars have neglected this development in their accounts of the EA trade
imbalances. While this might be explained by their focus on the intra-regional trade
imbalances between the CMEs and MMEs (see, especially, Johnston & Regan, 2016), it
will be shown below that their extra-regional imbalances (resulting from trade with
100 non-EA countries) grew almost as large in the pre-crisis years: the extra-regional trade
balance of the CMEs evolved almost as favorably as their intra-EA trade balance, while
the extra-regional trade deﬁcits of the MMEs in most cases exceeded their intra-
regional deﬁcits. The divergence in the extra-regional trade balance performance of the
CMEs and MMEs suggests that euro’s appreciation had asymmetrical effects on their
105 traded sectors. This again reﬂects differences in their non-price competitiveness: I dem-
onstrate below that traded sector ﬁrms of the CMES engage more often in production
strategies based on quality differentiation than those of the MMEs, where low-cost pro-
duction strategies prevail. To understand why, it is necessary to pay attention to institu-
tions underpinning these production strategies. More speciﬁcally, coordinated
110 institutions for skill development and vocational training allowed many tradable goods
producers in CMEs to pursue quality-differentiated production (DQP). Since traded
sectors of the MMEs lack similar institutions, their ﬁrms tend to be specialized in the
production of homogenous and standardized goods that are relatively price-elastic. As
a result, they were much more affected by the nominal appreciation of the euro ensuing
115 from the ECB’s single monetary policy.
Finally, I explain intra-model variety in the degree to which the ECB’s monetary pol-
icy has shaped wage-setting in the CMEs by pointing to the mediating effects of
national ﬁscal policy and regulatory approaches of household debt. In the pre-crisis
years of widening trade imbalances Germany was an outlier in the group of CMEs in
120 terms of the evolution of wages and ULC in both traded and non-traded sectors
(Baccaro & Pontusson, 2016; Hope, 2016Q2 ). The reason is related not only to its wage-
setting institutions and the ﬂexibilization of its labor market but also to its restrictive
ﬁscal policy and household credit regulations, which have depressed domestic demand
and made the German political economy increasingly dependent on exports. A focus
125 on ﬁscal and credit policies is necessary to understand the lack of reﬂationary adjust-
ment in Germany in the face or the ECB’s expansionary policy measures after the euro
crisis, which led to highly easy monetary conditions in the northern CMEs. Although
in early VoC formulations it was argued that an accommodative monetary regime will
encourage sufﬁciently large trade unions ‘to use their indirect power in product markets
130 to push up wages (Iversen, 1998Q3 D10, 481; see also Soskice & Iversen, 2000), Germany’s
post-crisis experience suggests that it takes more than expansionary monetary condi-
tions to break down the system of competiveness-oriented wage bargaining. If
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restrictive ﬁscal policies continue to privilege the interests of the traded sectors by
depressing domestic demand and containing economy-wide ULC, the ability of the
135 ECB’s monetary policy to provoke higher wage inﬂation in Germany (and in the other
CMEs) remains clearly limited.
Overall, the analysis in this D11paper explains how the institutionally infrastructure of
the CMEs bolstered the adaptability of their traded sectors to the ECB’s single mone-
tary policy and its three transmission mechanisms –both during the relatively restric-
140 tive monetary conditions of the pre-crisis years and the expansionary conditions after
the eruption of the euro crisis. Because MMEs lack the necessary institutional precondi-
tions for wage restraint and skill formation, the ECB’s monetary policy harmed the
interests of their traded sectors both in terms of declining proﬁt margins (due to ULC
inﬂation) and weakening price-competitiveness (due to both ULC inﬂation and the
145 euro’s nominal exchange appreciation) in the pre-crisis period. Since the outbreak of
the euro crisis the monetary policy of the ECB has been more beneﬁcial for these sec-
tors by restraining economy-wide ULC as well as by contributing to the nominal depre-
ciation of the euro. By showing how its monetary policy advantaged the interests of
traded sectors in both CMEs and MMEs for the very ﬁrst time since the introduction of
150 the euro, I will elucidate the role of the ECB in the export-led recovery of the EA.
D12This D13paper is organized D14as follows. D15The next section D16 D17discusses the CC literature on
the trade imbalances, arguing that D18one needs to go beyond the focus on wage setting
institutions to grasp the effects of the ECB’s single monetary policy on traded and non-
traded sectors in CMEs and MMEs. The subsequent, most elaborate, section provides
155 an empirical analysis of the effects the three monetary policy transmission channels in
the pre-crisis years of widening trade imbalances. The insights developed in this section
will be used to clarify the role of the ECB in the asymmetrical adjustment of the EA
trade imbalances after the crisis. Finally, D19the conclusion section D20 summarizes D21ﬁndings
and discusses several theoretical and political implications.
160 Varieties of capitalism, sectoral interests and monetary policy in the EA
The escalation of EA trade imbalances has ﬁgured prominently in the CC literature’s
explanation of the euro crisis: from a CC perspective, it was particularly noteworthy
that the southern MMEs accumulated increasing trade deﬁcits that were largely
ﬁnanced by the recycling of growing trade surpluses of the northern CME. A dominant
165 interpretation in the CC literature is that these imbalances mostly reﬂect a divergence
in the price competitiveness between the two groups of countries due to their differing
wage setting institutions (Hancke, 2013; Johnston et al., 2014; Johnston D22& Regan).
CMEs have well-organized employer associations and powerful trade unions, who
coordinate wages in a centralized bargaining setting that aims to bolster the competi-
170 tiveness of the export-oriented manufacturing sectors. In these countries unions usually
accept ‘wage restraint’ (i.e. D23 real wage growth not exceeding the growth in labor produc-
tivity) in order to boost employment of well-paid skilled workers in these sectors. These
wage agreements are subsequently extended through various arrangements to sector
that are sheltered from international competition (such as the public sector and private
175 non-traded sectors). Because in CMEs the export-oriented sectors play a dominant role
in the economy, there is a strong incentive to restrain wage and ULC growth in the
overall economy: their wage-setting institutions aim to prevent higher input prices of
goods and services produced by the non-traded sectors from leading to an ’inﬂationary
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squeeze’ on the traded sector (Garrett & Way, 1999; Johnston, 2012). Labor unions and
180 employers in MMEs are organized in weaker and more fragmented organizational
structures that are less effective containing wage and ULG growth. Especially in the
non-traded sectors that are shielded from international competition this typically leads
to higher inﬂation, which also undermines the price competitiveness of the traded
sectors.
185 Why was it more difﬁcult to contain the divergence in ULC between CMEs and
MMEs after the introduction of the euro? The CC literature gives two complementary
answers to this question. H€opner and Lutter (2014 D24, 7) argue that unions in CMEs
became more willing to exert wage restraint as its pay-offs became more certain and
pronounced within a monetary union: ‘If trade partners cannot devaluate, it becomes
190 more likely that nominal wage restraint will actually result in the enhancement of price
competitive ness not only in the short, but also in the medium run. Accession to a ﬁxed
currency regime should, therefore, gradually alter the relative weight of considerations
upon which exposed-sector trade unions base their wage demands’ (see also Iversen
et al., 2016). However, this explanation does not by itself clarify why the removal of the
195 nominal devaluation option did not reinforce the incentives among trade unions in the
MMEs to enact similar wage restraint. Another explanation therefore looks at the Euro-
peanization of monetary policy, which resuscitated tensions between wage setters in
traded and non-traded sectors in the MMEs. Before the euro unions in the latter sectors
were disciplined by national central banks that could thwart inﬂationary wage settle-
200 ments by adopting or threatening with restrictive monetary policies. Therefore, ‘the
replacement of national monetary authorities by the ECB had the inadvertent effect of
releasing trade unions in the sheltered sectors from the tight wage-setting constraints
that they had faced since the 1980s and 1990s’ (Hancke, 2013 D25, 64; see also Hancke D26&
Johnston, 2009; Johnston, 2012; Johnston & Regan, 2016).Q4 Consequently, wage inﬂation
205 in the southern MMEs rose signiﬁcantly, especially in sheltered sectors were ﬁrms
could more easily raise prices in response to rising labor costs.
Such interactions between monetary policy and wage bargaining reveal an important
channel through which the ECB’s single interest rate shaped sectoral interests and
hence contributed to two distinctive growth models in the region. Because the ECB
210 bases its interest rate decisions on region-wide average macroeconomic conditions
rather than on those of individual EA countries, its monetary policy underwrote the
export-led growth models of the CMEs and the consumption-led growth models of the
MMEs by resulting in relatively high real D27interest rates in the former group pf countries
and relatively low real interest rates in the latter. While the presence of wage setting
215 institutions containing ULC inﬂation in the non-traded sectors was central to the abil-
ity of traded sectors in the CMEs to improve their cost competitiveness vis-a-vis those
in the southern MMEs, relatively tight monetary conditions depressed domestic
demand and made it more easy to enact wage restraint in the non-traded sectors.
Expansionary monetary conditions in the MMEs, on the other hand, boosted domestic
220 demand and fueled wage inﬂation especially in the non-traded sectors. This weakened
the competiveness of the traded sectors in these countries by leading to an increase in
ULC and a real exchange rate appreciation (Hancke, 2013; Johnston & Regan, 2016).
These observations underscore an important claim developed by the recent VoC lit-
erature, which states that the successful operation of a growth model depends on a
225 complementary set of macroeconomic policies (Carlin & Soskice, 2009; Hall, 2017;
Iversen, 1999; Iversen et al., 2016; Iversen D28& Soskice, 2012; Sockice, 2007).Q5 In the
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export-led CMEs, coordinated wage bargaining is traditionally facilitated by non-
accommodating monetary policies that privilege the interests of the traded sectors by
sharpening trade unions’ incentives for wage restraint: unions are sufﬁciently coordi-
230 nated in these countries to internalize the effects of macroeconomic policy, which ena-
bles the non-accommodating central bank to deter wage increases with threats to
tighten monetary policy (Hall & Franzese, 1998; Soskice & Iversen, 2000). To avoid
neutralizing these threats, ﬁscal policy ‘must eschew an aggregate demand role’ and
also be restrictive in the CMEs (Soskice, 2007 D29, 101; Kalinowski D30&Hlasny, 2017).Q6 In the
235 MMEs, by contrast, ‘unions in the formal sector are individually small and uncoordi-
nated, so ‘[non-accommodating] monetary and ﬁscal policy cannot be used to deter
inﬂationary wage bargains [and] simply create unemployment’ (Iversen D31&Soskice,
2013).Q7 Because they depend much more on domestic demand, these countries prefer to
pursue more accommodating monetary and ﬁscal policies catered to the interests of the
240 non-traded sectors.
When looking at the main features of the Eurozone’s macroeconomic policy regime
laid down by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), it is clear
that the macroeconomic policy preferences of the CMEs prevailed (Fioretos, 2001Q8 ;
Iversen et al., 2016; Vermeiren, 2014). The TFEU gave the ECB a single mandate to pri-
245 oritize the maintenance of price stability – deﬁned as a medium-run EA-average con-
sumer price inﬂation rate below but near 2 D32% – over the pursuit of economic growth
(Article 127.4). Moreover, it introduced several safeguards against the risk of monetiza-
tion of sovereign debts: Article 123 of the TFEU rules out all types of monetary ﬁnanc-
ing of EU and government institutions by the ECB, whereas Article 125 (‘no-bailout’
250 clause) prohibits EU (institutions from taking over the liabilities of any member state
government and administrative body. These restrictive rules were introduced to impose
ﬁscal discipline on the EA governments and ensure that they would abide by the rules
of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which stipulates that ﬁscal deﬁcit levels should
not exceed 3% of GDP. While these restrictive macroeconomic policy rules would bol-
255 ster the export-led growth models of the CMEs by promoting wage restraint, they had
also beneﬁcial effects for the growth models of the MMEs: by pinning themselves to a
low-inﬂation currency area, MMEs gained access to lower real interest rates that could
be seen as key drivers of domestic demand (Iversen et al., 2016).
While signiﬁcantly improving our understanding of the linkages between macroeco-
260 nomic policy and wage setting in these two different VoC D33, the above analysis leaves sev-
eral important questions regarding the sectoral effects of the ECB’s monetary policy
unanswered. First, it remains unclear to which degree differences in wage setting in the
CMEs and MMEs explain divergences in price setting in their traded sectors: differences
in cost competitiveness do not automatically translate into differences in price competi-
265 tiveness (Felioe & Kumar, 2011; Gaulier & Vicar, 2013). There seems to be an implicit
assumption in the VoC literature that ﬁrms in traded sectors in the CMEs exploited the
economy-wide decline in relative ULC by reducing their product prices relative to their
foreign competitors – i.e. that the divergence in cost competitiveness between traded
sectors in the two country groups gave rise to an equivalent divergence in price compet-
270 itiveness. Figure 1 suggests that this has not been the case: it plots the accumulated
change in economy-wide nominal ULC of the former EU15 countries against the accu-
mulated change in their industry’s export price index from 1999 to 2008 and shows
that there is only a very weak correlation between the two variables (R2 < 0.3). In the
next section I use a variety of sector-level data to show that trade sector ﬁrms
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275 responded to the favorable evolution of ULC by raising proﬁt margins rather than low-
ering product prices. Based on these data, I argue that there is another channel through
which wage restraint beneﬁted these ﬁrms: higher proﬁtability combined with buoyant
foreign demand allowed these ﬁrms to remain unaffected by the relatively high real
interest rates ensuing from the ECB’s one-size-ﬁts none monetary policy, as they had
280 sufﬁcient retained internal funds to ﬁnance their investments and ensure an expansion
of their productive capacities.
Second, the ECB’s restrictive mandate gave rise to an ‘appreciation bias’ in its
approach of the euro’s nominal exchange rate, potentially undermining the price com-
petitiveness of traded sector ﬁrms vis-a-vis non-EA producers. As the ECB’s exchange
285 rate preferences are only determined by inﬂation considerations (Kaltenthaler, 2006),
its monetary policy might be skewed toward euro appreciation under ordinary non-
deﬂationary macroeconomic conditions: while the ECB will normally adjust its interest
rate to reverse an inﬂationary depreciation of the euro, it will likely be more willing to
accept an excessive euro appreciation due to its tempering effects on regional inﬂation
290 (Vermeiren, 2014).1 The appreciation of the euro, shown in Figure 1, is an endogenous
shock that existing VoC scholars of the EA trade imbalances have strangely overlooked.
One reason for their neglect is that they seem to believe intra-regional trade
imbalances D34 – that is, the imbalances arising from intra-regional trade between the EA
countries – have been much more important than extra-regional trade imbalances (see,
295 especially, Johnston & Regan, 2016, discussed below). To the extent that these scholars
have paid attention to the euro’s nominal exchange rate, it is argued that ‘ﬂuctuations
of the euro’s external exchange rate, especially against the US dollar, hit Germany more
than D35other [EA] countries’ (Hancke, 2013 D36, 74). Below I challenge both ﬁndings: I will
show that the extra-EA trade balances of the MMEs deteriorated as much as their
300 intra-regional ones in the pre-crisis years, while extra-regional trade balances of the
CMEs either remained broadly stable or improved signiﬁcantly – D37as in Germany’s case.
The remarkable extra-regional trade balance performance of the CMEs, especially
Figure 1 Correlation between economy-wide ULC and export price index (2000–2008).
Source: AMECO; Eurostat; author’s calculations. Note: Export price index = non-domestic producer price index of industry. Start
year for Belgium = 2001. For Ireland and Portugal AMECO’s export price deﬂator was used.
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Germany’s, suggests that their traded sectors were largely unaffected by the euro’s
appreciation.
305 Both observations point to the importance of divergences in non-price competive-
ness, which are crucial for understanding the varied effects of the different transmission
mechanisms of the ECB’s monetary policy on traded sectors in the region. These diver-
gences are well-established in the CC and VoC literature and follow from the divergent
institutional capacity of CMEs and MMEs to produce quality-differentiated goods, the
310 demand for which is relatively price-inelastic. Due to the presence of encompassing
institutions for vocational education and training and an effective national innovation
system, ﬁrms in the traded sectors of the CMEs are able to employ highly-skilled work-
ers and hence more likely to engage in high valued-added production strategies based
on quality differentiation (Streeck, 1991Q9 ; Hall & Soskice, 2001). These ﬁrms were there-
315 fore unharmed by the euro’s nominal appreciation and could raise proﬁt margins in
response to declining ULC, giving them ample internal resources to ﬁnance their
investments. As MMEs, by contrast, are generally deﬁned by ‘the relative weakness of
their educational and training systems’ (Lallement, 2011D38, 637), ‘larger segments of [their]
workforce are less skilled and continuous innovation is more difﬁcult to achieve’ (Hall,
320 2014Q10 D39, 1226; see also Molina & Rhodes, 2007). As a result, traded sector ﬁrms in these
countries tend to engage in low-cost production strategies leading to a comparative spe-
cialization in the production of standardized goods with lower added value and quality
(Della Sala, 2004; Schmidt, 2003). Because ﬁrms usually produce goods with a high price
elasticity, they were more harmed by the euro’s nominal appreciation and more inclined
325 to cut proﬁt margins when labor cost rise. Taking to account their decreasing proﬁt mar-
gins and declining price competitiveness, ﬁrms in the non-traded sectors were the prime
beneﬁciaries of relatively low real interest rates in these countries (see below).
Apart from disregarding the role of these monetary policy transmission mecha-
nisms, existing VoC accounts the EA trade imbalances have neither paid sufﬁcient
330 attention to the fact that the CMEs displayed signiﬁcant intra-model variety in the
extent to which their growth model was based on wage restraint and a depression of
consumption: this was certainly the case for Germany (and to a lesser degree Austria),
but less so for the others. Below I show that in the pre-crisis years Germany’s growth
model was less balanced than those of the other CMEs, where wages in the non-traded
335 sheltered sectors grew faster and consumption played a stronger role in economic
growth. While scholars of CC have explained Germany’s sharp ULC devaluation by the
decentralization of its wage-setting institutions and ﬂexibilization of its labor market
since the 1990s (Baccaro D40& Benassi, 2016Q11 ; Hassel, 2014Q12 ), I highlight the importance of
restrictive ﬁscal policy and approaches to household credit in depressing public and
340 private consumption. These institutions mediate the effects of the ECB’s monetary pol-
icy on domestic consumption and clarify why ultra-expansionary monetary conditions
in the post-crisis years have not translated into more signiﬁcant wage inﬂation. The
debate about the role of wage dynamic in Germany’s trade balance remains an unset-
tled issue in the CC literature, however. Baccaro and Pontusson (2016) have recently
345 argued from a ‘Kaleckian’ growth model perspective that the repression of wages was
key to bolstering the competiveness of German manufacturing sectors, whose exports
they believe became more price-sensitive over time (see also Baccaro D41& Benassi 2016).
The empirical analysis in the next section challenges this interpretation, arguing that
wage repression in Germany resulted in lower consumption (and import) growth
350 rather than higher export growth compared to the other CMEs.
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ECB monetary policy and widening trade imbalances (2002–2009)
Transmission channel 1: wage and price setting
According to the above-discussed VoC literature, the setting of wages in labor and
product markets is the main channel through which the ECB affected sectoral interests
355 and fueled trade imbalances. Relatively high real interest rates resulting from its single
monetary enabled traded sectors in the CMEs to improve their cost competitiveness by
inducing trade unions to pursue wage restraint. Relatively low real interest rates in the
MMEs, on the other hand, undermined the cost competitiveness of their traded sectors
by fueling wage inﬂation, especially in their non-traded sectors. Table 1 shows the evo-
360 lution in UL – and its components ‘labor productivity’ and ‘labor compensation’ – in
different economic sectors from 1999 to 2007. In line with the interpretation of the
VoC literature, wages, and ULC in the non-traded sectors grew more strongly higher in
the MMEs than in the CMEs (Finland excluded) and/or were not sufﬁciently neutral-
ized by weaker/negative ULC growth in the traded sectors (as in Finland). The same
365 table shows that there was considerable variation among the CMEs in terms of annual
growth in labor compensation in the non-traded sectors. Germany was a clear outlier
in this regard, which is usually explained by the liberalization of industrial relations
and wage setting institutions especially in the labor-intensive services sectors (Baccaro
& Benassi, 2017; Dustmann, Fitzenberger, Sch€onberg, & Spitz-Oener, 2014). Accord-
370 ingly, its export-led growth models coincided with weaker private consumption growth
than in the other CMEs, as shown in Table 2 D42.
Additional indicators of the EA countries’ growth models presented in Table 2 sug-
gest that Germany’s repressed wage and consumption growth should also be linked to
weak public spending and its restrictive approach of household credit. First, Germany
375 adopted more restrictive ﬁscal policies than the other CMEs: its cyclically adjusted gov-
ernment primary balance – which measures discretionary changes in the government’s
ﬁscal policy by removing its net debt interest payments and correcting for the position
Table 1. Average annual growth in unit labor costs and its components (1999-2007).
1999–2007 1999–2007
Value
added
Labor
compensation ULC
Value
added
Labor
compensation ULC
Austria France
Traded 4.3 2.9 ¡1.4 Traded 4.4 3.6 ¡0.8
Non-traded 1.4 2.2 0.7 Non-traded 1.0 3.4 2.4
Belgium Greece
Traded 3.9 3.1 ¡0.8 Traded 3.2 4.2 1.1
Non-traded 2.3 2.9 0.5 Non-traded 3.8 6.0 2.2
Finland Italy
Traded 7.3 3.9 ¡3.2 Traded 1.5 3.0 1.5
Non-traded 0.5 3.4 2.9 Non-traded ¡0.3 2.6 2.9
Germany Portugal
Traded 3.9 2.4 ¡1.5 Traded 2.9 3.7 0.8
Non-traded 0.7 1.3 0.6 Non-traded 0.5 4.1 3.6
Netherlands Spain
Traded 6.7 3.6 ¡0.8 Traded 2.2 3.9 1.6
Non-traded 1.9 3.7 1.8 Non-traded ¡2.1 2.9 5.0
Per hour worked.
Source: OECD.
Note: Traded sector = manufacturing; non-traded sector = average of construction and business sector
services.
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of the economy in the business cycle – improved from minus 1.05 of GDP in 2000 to
plus 1.4 D43% in 2007. D44Therefore, despite the fact that the domestic economy was already
380 weak during this period because of relatively high real interest rates, the German gov-
ernment’s ﬁscal policy restrained it even further. While it might have felt the need to
reduce public expenditures because of the exigencies of the SGP, it also ‘sharpened the
incentives for wage restraint … by abandoning discretionary ﬁscal policy and therefore
removing this possibility’ (Carlin & Soskice, 2009 D45, 90).2 The overall ﬁscal policy stance
385 was more expansionary in the other CMEs if we look at the evolution in their cyclically
adjusted government primary balance and the contribution of public consumption to
GDP growth. This can also be linked to their ‘larger and more robust public sectors’,
‘which ‘enable smaller 50-10 wage gaps, due to their impacts on redistribution and
social investments in lower-skilled workers’ (Martin, 2016 D46, 230). Employment in the
390 public sector as a percentage of total employment is signiﬁcantly higher in Belgium,
Finland and Netherlands than in Germany and Austria. As Martin (2016 D47, 230) argues,
such ‘large public sectors produce higher levels of demand by stimulating the economy
with the multiplier effect and … directly expand consumption by marginal groups,
because state employment of low-skill workers tends to raise low-end employment and
395 wages.’
Second, Germany had more restrictive retail banking regulations, which depressed
the growth in household debt between 2000 and 2008 (Mertens, 2017). Fuller (2015)
recently showed that there is considerable variation in the degree to which CMEs
encourage or mitigate household borrowing, either through interest rate restrictions,
400 property transfer taxation, loan-to-value regulations, mortgage interest taxation or sup-
porting/curtailing secondary markets for consumer debt (see also Barnes 2016Q13 ). Table 2
indicates that in Germany, who together with Austria had the most stringent household
credit regulations among, even declined during the 2000s. In the Netherlands, who had
the most permissive credit regulatory framework, household debt increased from 200 D48%
405 as a percentage of net disposable income in 2000 to almost 275% D49 in 2008. As house-
holds ‘tend to borrow more and increase borrowing faster where wages were high’
(Fuller, 2015: 260), the growth in Dutch household debt can be connected to relativity
strong wage growth in the non-traded sectors. This could explain why household debt
Table 2. Indicators of national growth models.
Average annual contribution to
GDP growth (1999–2008)
Change in government
primary balance
adjustment
Household debt
in % of net
disposable
income
House price
index change
Exports Private C Public C 1999–2007 2000 2008 2000–2008
CMEs
Austria 2.79 0.96 0.32 ¡0.24 75.5 90.2 ¡1.5
Belgium 3.24 0.74 0.40 ¡3.67 70.6 89.1 47.7
Germany 2.43 0.51 0.19 0.12 116.5 99.4 ¡13.4
Finland 2.86 1.55 0.34 ¡1.13 74.8 117.2 28.7
Netherlands 3.40 0.81 0.75 ¡2.46 199.2 274.6 23.2
MMEs
France 1.02 1.26 0.36 ¡2.39 74.8 99.4 79.9
Greece 1.47 2.40 0.68 ¡8.23 30.4 86.9 48.3
Italy 0.72 0.61 0.25 ¡2.89 54.5 81.6 43.1
Portugal 1.23 1.30 0.42 0.73 106.8 148.9 ¡17.4
Spain 1.18 1.94 0.85 ¡2.28 84.2 150.2 96.7
Source: AMECO; OECD.
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also grew signiﬁcantly in Belgium and Finland even in the face of more stringent credit
410 regulations. While the growth of household debt led to a boom in housing markets in
these CMEs, the ensuing stronger consumption growth did not disrupt their export-led
growth model. They had less developed consumer credit markets and less opportunities
to extract home equity loans, so their household debt mostly consisted of mortgage
debt (Schwartz D50& Seabrooke, 2008).Q14 Moreover, as Johnston and Regan (2017) argue,
415 wage-setting institutions coordinated by export-led political coalitions enabled a coun-
tercyclical incomes policy that tamed the inﬂationary effects of sharp increases in mort-
gage debt.
Which role did wage restraint play in the surge of Germany’s trade surplus? A com-
mon interpretation in the CC literature is that the repression of wages in the non-
420 traded sectors boosted Germany’s exports by strengthening the price competitiveness
of its manufacturing ﬁrms (e.g. Baccaro & Benassi, 2017; Baccaro & Pontusson, 2016;
Dustmann et al., 2014; Hassel 2014). Table 3 shows the growth in merchandise trade
between the CMEs with the world and the rest of the Eurozone between 1999 and
2008: what set Germany apart from the other CMEs during this period was not higher
425 export growth but weaker import growth. The surge in Germany’s trade surplus was
therefore more based on depressed consumption than on the extraordinary perfor-
mance of its export sector. There are two explanations for this. First, as discussed above
(see Figure 1), the Germany’s decline in relative ULC did not translate into an equiva-
lent improvement of its price competitiveness, as its traded sectors exploited the repres-
430 sion of wages and ULC by raising proﬁt margins. Table 4 compares the evolution in
unit wage costs in the industrial sectors and non-traded sectors between 1999 and 2007
Table 3. Growth in merchandise trade between 1999 and 2008 in percentage.
World trade Eurozone trade
Exports Imports Exports Imports
Austria 190.6 165.2 157.9 141.4
Belgium 163.8 183.3 161.2 183.7
Finland 132.0 191.6 100.6 173.7
Germany 170.1 154.3 151.6 124.6
Netherlands 220.1 194.8 219.9 206.9
Source: WITS Database; author’s calculations.
Table 4. Percentage change in price deﬂator and unit wage costs (1999–2007).
Industry Non-traded
Price deﬂator Unit wage costs Price deﬂator Unit wage costs
CMEs
Austria 5.5 ¡7.3 15.9 5.9
Belgium 1.2 ¡3.7 16.8 9.8
Germany 2.9 ¡11.8 8.5 0.9
Finland ¡11.0 ¡21.4 33.0 29.8
Netherlands 19.8 ¡0.4 31.7 16.6
MMEs
France ¡4.3 ¡4.0 31.3 25.2
Greece 23.6 18.8 19.7 51.8
Italy 13.0 14.0 31.6 31.6
Portugal 12.4 3.9 38.9 43.1
Spain 26.9 19.6 49.1 55.3
Source: AMECO; author’s calculations.
Note: Statistics for the-traded sectors are an average of those the construction and real estate sector and serv-
ices sector.
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with aggregate changes in production prices – measured by the price deﬂator – in these
sectors. Unit wage costs in the industrial sector decreased in the CMEs, yet their output
prices increased or fell less than wage costs (as in Finland). At the same time, product
435 price inﬂation in the non-traded sectors signiﬁcantly outpaced the growth in unit wage
costs, so wage restraint in these sectors was insufﬁcient to contain the input costs of
ﬁrms in the traded sectors. While there seems to be a closer connection between unit
wage costs and price setting in the MMEs, it is clear that the divergence in ULC
between the two groups of countries did neither give rise to a corresponding divergence
440 in price competiveness. Second, and relatedly, price competiveness has been less crucial
for the export performance of the Germany and the other CMEs than is commonly
argued in CC literature (see also Storm & Naastepad, 2015; Schulten, 2015Q15 ). As I elabo-
rate in the next sub-section, it also suggests another channel through which wage
restraint assisted traded sectors in the CMEs to deal with the consequences of the
445 ECB’s one-size-ﬁts-none monetary policy.
Transmission channel 2: funding and capital costs
The second transmission channel through which the ECB’ monetary policy affected
sectoral interests and contributed to the EA trade imbalances is through its effect on
ﬁrms’ capital costs and investments. Because its single monetary policy resulted rela-
450 tively high real interest rates for the CMEs, ﬁrms in both traded and non-traded sectors
were faced with relatively high funding and capital costs that potentially reduced their
investment spending. There is usually a negative relationship between corporate invest-
ment and real interest rates, even if relational banking plays a central role in the provi-
sion of external ﬁnancing for ﬁrms in these countries (Culpepper, 2005; Hall & Soskice
455 2001). Given that CMEs increasingly moved towards market-based banking in ways
that potentially diminished the supply of patient capital (Hardie et al., 2016Q16 ), it might
be assumed that real interest rates became even more important in shaping
manufacturing ﬁrms’ investment decisions over the past decades. Many economists,
for instance, have argued that restrictive macroeconomic policies in Germany contrib-
460 uted to weak investment spending (e.g. Bibow, 2007Q17 ; Hein D51& Truger, 200718 ). So even if
the ECB’s single monetary policy beneﬁted traded sectors in the CMEs by encouraging
wage restraint, these sectors might have been harmed by the effects of high real interest
Table 5. Change in investment (2001–2007) in percentage points of GDP.Q19
Total
traded
FDI
traded
Domestic
traded
Total
non-traded
FDI
non-traded
Domestic
non-traded
CMEs
Austria 2.4 2.8 ¡0.4 ¡1.84 ¡0.41 ¡1.43
Belgium 7.33 8.03 ¡0.7 1.34 0 1.34
Finland ¡0.53 ¡1.2 0.67 1.6 ¡0.2 1.8
Germany 4.46 4.84 ¡0.38 ¡2.99 ¡1.44 ¡1.55
Netherlands 1.15 1.53 ¡0.38 ¡2.01 ¡1.89 ¡0.12
MMEs
France ¡1.27 ¡0.84 ¡0.43 2.75 0.62 2.13
Greece ¡0.9 ¡0.07 ¡0.83 2.23 0.12 2.11
Italy ¡0.24 ¡0.15 ¡0.09 1.05 ¡0.12 1.17
Portugal ¡1.1 ¡0.39 ¡0.71 ¡6.64 ¡2.45 ¡4.19
Spain ¡1.15 ¡0.56 ¡0.59 7.27 1.87 5.4
Source: OECD; author’s calculations.
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rates on their investment spending and longer-term expansion of their productive
capacities.
465 In order to assess the real interest rate vulnerability of traded sectors’ investment
spending, it is necessary to look at both their domestic capital spending and foreign
direct investments (FDI): tradable goods producers tend to be internationalized ﬁrms
that also invest a signiﬁcant part of their funds abroad. As shown D52in Table 6, total
investment spending by the traded sectors as a share of GDP actually increased, on
470 average, by 2.93 percentage points in the CMEs between 2001 and 2007 when FDI
spending is also taken into account. Only Finland experienced a small decline in aggre-
gate traded sector investment spending during this period, but is was also the only
CME where traded sectors’ domestic capital formation grew as a share of GDP. Espe-
cially Germany’s performance in terms of traded sector investment spending is remark-
475 able, given that it became ‘systematically biased towards deﬂation’ in the context of the
ECB’s single monetary policy (Hancke, 2013 D53, 76). Strong growth of manufacturing FDI
suggests that traded sectors in Germany were unaffected by the comparatively high real
interest rates resulting from Europeanized monetary policy: several studies have
revealed how pre-crisis German export growth can be traced partly to the ability of its
480 exporters to exploit new production and cost cutting opportunities from offshoring
activities to Central and Eastern Europe, thereby increasing the productivity of parent
companies in Germany by more than 20% D54 (Marin, 2010).
How can strong investment spending by traded sectors in the CMEs in the face of
relatively high real interest rates be explained? Previous research found that rising prof-
485 itability enhance the self-ﬁnancing capabilities of the ﬁrm by resulting into higher
retained earnings, making it more likely to substitute long-term debt with internal
ﬁnancing (Booth, Aivazian, Demirg€uc¸-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2001; Demirg€uc¸-Kunt &
Maksimovic, 1996). Table 6 presents the evolution in the overall proﬁt share of the
non-ﬁnancial sector (NFC) together with two conceptually distinct measures of proﬁt-
490 ability of traded and non-traded sectors in the CMEs and MMEs. The ﬁrst ratio – the
price mark-up – measures how ﬁrms have adjusted output prices in response to
changes in ULC in their respective sectors. The second one – the net/gross proﬁt
margin – is the ratio between net/gross operating surplus and gross value added in
Table 6. Change in proﬁtability in percentage points between 1999 and 2007.
Proﬁt share Traded sectors Non-traded sectors
NFC sector Price markup Gross margin Price markup Net margin
CMEs
Austria 4.8 8.4 5.9 8.5 2.6
Belgium 4.8 3.6 1.3 12.0 2.7
Finland 1.2 9.3 1.5 4.9 ¡1.6
Germany 5.1 12.2 9.8 4.3 1.9
Netherlands 2.7 14.8 5.6 10.4 3.6
MMEs
France ¡0.1 ¡3.3 ¡4.1 3.6 0.7
Greece NA ¡8.5 ¡4.0 5.2 5.0
Italy ¡3.9 ¡5.0 ¡3.4 ¡0.4 4.2
Portugal ¡2.6 6.6 1.3 1.5 11.0
Spain ¡0.3 ¡4.8 NA ¡2.3 ¡3.2
Source: OECD; Eurostat; AMECO; author’s calculations.
Note: Proﬁt share of the non-ﬁnancial corporate sector refers to ratio of gross operation surplus to gross value
added.
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 13
RRIP_A_1377628.3d (Compact Serif) (156£234mm) 12-09-2017 16:10
these sectors. Both measures suggest that proﬁtability of the traded sectors grew
495 markedly compared to the non-traded sectors in the CMEs; combined with the fact
that the share of manufacturing sectors increased in total value added (Figure 3), these
data suggest that traded sectors were the prime source of the overall increase in the
proﬁt share of the NFC in these countries. It can therefore be argued that the combina-
tion of strong export demand and growing proﬁt margins increased the availability of
500 internal funds and made their investment decisions less responsive to real interest rate
dynamics. Again, Germany is a case in point. According to a Bundesbank report, the
Figure 3 Change in the share of manufacturing in total value added in percentage points.
Source: AMECO. Note: In constant (2010) prices.
Figure 2 Nominal exchange rate of the euro (effective and against the US dollar).
Source: ECB.
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surge in internal funds in the NFC sector was ‘promoted by the overall favorable global
economic climate over this period and the improvement in the international competi-
tiveness of German enterprises, which was in turn supported by moderate wage
505 increases’ (Bundesbank 2012Q20 : 18). Kuzin and Schobert (2014)21 also found that ‘German
export ﬁrms demand[ed] less domestic credit and [could] ﬁnance higher production
from retained proﬁts’ that ‘tend to substitute domestic credit … when export revenues
are high’ (2014 D55, 10-11).
In the MMEs, on the other hand, declining proﬁtability of the traded sectors com-
510 pared to non-traded sectors is a key reason why particularly the latter sectors beneﬁted
from low real interest rates. Despite the fact that producers of non-tradable goods and
services in these countries were confronted with rising ULC, they were able to secure
and in many cases even improve their proﬁt margins by raising output prices even
more. So non-traded sectors were not necessarily handicapped in real terms by wage
515 inﬂation, as ﬁrms in these non-exposed sectors could easily raise prices D56 to protect their
proﬁts without losing market share – especially in heavily regulated product markets in
which competition is impeded. For instance, real ULC in the Spanish construction sec-
tor decreased by more than 20% between 1999 and 2008 because output prices grew
even faster than wages.3 This corroborates the analysis by Hopkin (2015), who argues
520 that in the southern EA countries ‘groups associated with conservative political forces,
such as government-regulated industries in the sheltered sector of the economy and
more broadly, the small business and self-employed sector, were particularly well
placed to ride the boom’ by being able ‘to exploit buoyant demand conditions to hike
prices, limiting real wage growth despite nominal wages rising faster than productivity.’
525 Especially these groups beneﬁted from the easy credit conditions resulting from the
ECB’s single monetary policy, which bolstered domestic demand for their services and
reduced their funding costs. Because traded sectors were unable to protect their proﬁt
margins without losing market share, investment in these sectors was less attractive
and therefore dropped considerably as a share of GDP from 2001 to 2007 (Table 7).
530 In the next section, I examine another reason why traded sectors in the MMEs had
less investment opportunities than non-traded sectors during this period – the nominal
appreciation of the euro, which trimmed import costs for the latter sectors at the
expense of further weakening the price competitiveness of the former sectors.
Transmission channel 3: nominal exchange rate of the euro
535 In the context of the ECB’s single monetary policy, higher wage inﬂation in the periph-
eral EA countries contributed to the appreciation of the euro’s external exchange rate.
Due to higher ULC growth and national inﬂation in the southern MMEs, the nominal
interest rate consistent with the ECB’s EA D57 average 2% inﬂation target was higher than
in the situation in which there would have been more wage restraint in these countries.
540 Given that a higher nominal interest rate is more attractive for international investors,
the nominal exchange rate of the euro was also higher and became overvalued in face
of the ECB’s mandate to maintain region-wide price stability. Figure 1 showed that the
euro’s nominal exchange rate experienced a massive appreciation between 2002 and
2009, especially against the US dollar. Estimates of the ‘equilibrium exchange rate’ of
545 the euro indicated that by 2005 the range of overvaluation for the ‘fundamental equilib-
rium rate’ of the euro was already between 6.3% and 46.9%, suggesting that the euro
was hugely overvalued when it reached its peak against the US dollar in 2007/9
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(Benassy-Quere, Bereau, & Mignon, 2008). Because the annual growth of the broad
money supply (M3) and consumer price inﬂation (CPI) exceeded the ECB’s respective
550 targets of 4.5% and 2% during this period, the ECB could only have averted the over-
valuation of the euro via the provision of additional easy money in ways that would
have ultimately threatened its price stability mandate. In this regard, it important to
note that the ECB targets the ‘Harmoni D58zed Index of Consumer Prices’ as its CPI index,
which also tracks the price of food and energy: the boom in global food and energy pri-
555 ces during the second half of the 2000s was a key reason why the ECB could not pre-
vent further euro appreciation via a more expansionary monetary policy.
Table 7 indicates that the nominal appreciation of the euro had an asymmetrical
impact on traded sectors in the CMEs and MMEs between 2002 and 2009: the CMEs
signiﬁcantly outperformed the MMEs in terms of the evolution of both their intra-EA
560 and extra-EA merchandise trade balances. These observations contrast with the inter-
pretation of Johnston and Regan (2016D59, 7) that ‘the divergences in current … accounts
that we observe in the D60EA is an internal relation’: ‘[T]he growing gap between intra-EU
trade deﬁcits in the South and intra-EU trade surpluses in the North is noticeably
prominent after the creation of the single currency. However, the Southern domestic
565 demand-led countries and the Northern export-led ones perform almost identically in
regards to trade balances vis-a-vis non-EU countries after 1999’. There are several prob-
lems with their interpretation, however. First, they included France in the group of
northern EA countries although its extra-regional trade balance deteriorated signiﬁ-
cantly. While France scored equally well as the CME D61 average in terms of ULC dynam-
570 ics, it does not have the coordinated institutions that were critical in allowing its
Table 7. Intra- and extra-EA trade balance in percentage of GDP.
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
CMEs
Austria Intra-EA ¡2.1 ¡4.2 ¡3.6 ¡4.8 ¡4.1 ¡4.8 ¡3.7
Extra-EA 2.1 3.7 3.2 3.3 1.5 0.6 2.0
Belgium Intra-EA 4.5 7.2 6.2 6.8 4.5 1.2 4.0
Extra-EA 3 1.8 1.0 ¡1.1 2.3 3.3 3.8
Finland Intra-EA 2.5 0.7 0.5 0.2 ¡1.2 ¡0.9 ¡0.6
Extra-EA 4.5 4.6 2.4 1.9 0.6 ¡0.8 ¡0.7
Germany Intra-EA 2.7 4.6 4.9 5.8 4.4 3.3 2.8
Extra-EA 2.8 3.6 2.9 4.6 2.9 4.7 6.0
Netherlands Intra-EA 9.4 12.5 14.3 17.6 17.6 19.4 18.7
Extra-EA ¡2.2 ¡2.5 ¡1.5 ¡3.1 ¡1.6 0.0 2.4
MMEs
France Intra-EA 0 ¡0.3 ¡1.0 ¡2.2 ¡2.0 ¡2.6 ¡2.3
Extra-EA 0.2 ¡0.8 ¡1.9 ¡3.0 ¡2.5 ¡2.8 ¡2.3
Greece Intra-EA ¡6.6 ¡10.2 ¡9.7 ¡12.6 ¡7.8 ¡6.3 ¡6.7
Extra-EA ¡6.7 ¡9.4 ¡10.1 ¡13.4 ¡9.7 ¡8.6 ¡9
Italy Intra-EA ¡0.6 ¡1 ¡0.7 ¡0.3 ¡1.4 ¡0.7 ¡0.4
Extra-EA 1.4 1.2 0.0 0.5 ¡¡1.8 ¡0.1 2.6
Portugal Intra-EA ¡7.8 ¡9.8 ¡11.5 ¡15.3 ¡12.1 ¡3.5 ¡8.6
Extra-EA ¡2.3 ¡3.8 ¡4.7 ¡6.2 ¡4.3 ¡5.6 ¡0.2
Spain Intra-EA ¡2.2 ¡3.6 ¡4.0 ¡3.5 ¡¡0.2 1.0 0.8
Extra-EA ¡3.3 ¡5.6 ¡8.0 ¡9.7 ¡6.5 ¡4.8 ¡4.1
Source: WITS UN COMTRADE Database; author’s calculations.
Note: The Rotterdam and Antwerp effect on the extra-regional trade balance of the Netherlands and Belgium
was canceled out by assuming that their imports from China are in fact collective EA imports, which were
added to the EA countries’ imports according to their share in the region’s GDP.
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manufacturing ﬁrms to preserve their non-price competitiveness with regard to extra-
regional competitors. This again points to the importance of other institutions than
those responsible for productively-aligned wage restraint. Second, their focus on extra-
EU rather than extra-EMU trade imbalances is inapt in light of the fact that the euro
575 appreciated considerably against other EU currencies like the British pound during this
period. Finally, and most importantly, they do not account for the ‘port effect’ of Rot-
terdam and Antwerp on the Netherlands’ and Belgium’s extra-EA trade balance: as
Rotterdam and Antwerp are two key transit ports where many imports from the non-
EA world are unloaded and reloaded as exports to other EA countries, ofﬁcial trade sta-
580 tistics understate their extra-regional trade balance and overstate their intra-regional
trade balance.
The extra-EA trade balance data depicted in Table Y ﬁltered out two important
sources of the Rotterdam and Antwerp effect: imports from China and oil imports (see
De Ville & Vermeiren, 2016 for more details). The superior extra-regional trade balance
585 performance of CMEs reﬂects their superior non-price competitiveness. A plethora of
empirical studies have shown that the price elasticity of exports from the EA’s CMEs is
low. Due to the dominance of capital goods with low-D62price elasticity in Germany’s trade
structure, Belke, Goecke, and Guenther (2008) estimate the nominal exchange rate
‘pain threshold’ for its exports to be around US$/€1.55 – much higher than for MMEs’
590 exports. According to estimations by Rey (2011)Q22 , price elasticities of extra-EA exports
are three times higher for France than for Germany. The importance of non-price com-
petitiveness is not restricted to Germany, however. Decramer, Fuss, and Konings
(2014) found only a small negative effect of ULC on the export performance of Belgian
ﬁrms with an estimated elasticity of the intensive margin of exports ranging between
595 -0.2 and -0.4, suggesting that pass-through of costs onto prices is limited and/or that
demand for exported products is almost price-inelastic. Table 9 shows the European
Commission’s (2014)Q23 recent estimations of the elasticity of export demand of several
CMEs and MMEs to the REER and foreign demand: exports of CMEs have signiﬁcantly
lower elasticity to REER changes and higher elasticity to foreign demand than exports
600 of MMEs. These results were corroborated by Wierts, Van Kerkhoff, and De Haan
(2014), who found that the effect of the REER on exports is much smaller for the north-
ern EA countries than for the southern EA countries, whereas the effect of partner
income is higher – a divergence they attribute to the higher share of high technology
goods in these countries’ exports.
605 The heterogeneity in exchange rate vulnerability among producers of tradable
goods can be linked to the extent to which changes in the exchange rate need to be
passed on to consumers in the price of the ﬁnal product. Producers of quality-
differentiated goods are better able to pass-through exchange rate changes onto out-
put prices, as demand for these types of goods is less price-sensitive. Producers of
610 standardized goods, the demand for which is more price-sensitive, more often need
to ‘price-to market’ and adjust output prices to exchange rate ﬂuctuations. At the
same time, producers of quality-differentiated goods are inclined to have higher
markups, which gives them more scope to reduce output prices in response to nomi-
nal exchange rate appreciation (Bussiere, delle Chaie, & Peltonen, 2014; Vigfusson,
615 Sheets, & Gagnon, 2007). Therefore, it can be argued that the low- D 6 3price elasticity of
CME exports follows from the fact that many tradable goods producers have
adopted DQP strategies in the CMEs. Which competitive strategy of ﬁrms prevails
in a country can be measured by the Weighted relative unit value (WRUV) of the
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country’s relatively ﬁve most important export sectors, which is a concept developed
620 by Hancke and Herrmann (2007) based upon the assumption that differences in pri-
ces reﬂect quality differences. The relatively most important sectors are determined
by calculating the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA), which is obtained by
comparing the export share of a product in a country’s total exports to the share of
that product in the world’s total exports:
RCA ¼ Exports of Country A in Sector=Total Exports of Country A
World Exports inSector=Total World Exports
:
625 After identifying the ﬁve most important sectors in which a country has a compara-
tive advantage (i.e. D6 4 sectors in which it exports comparatively more than the world
average and which assume at least 1% of its total exports), the Relative Unit Value
(RUV) for every sector can be calculated by comparing its unit prices to the EA-12
630 unit prices in these sectors:
RUV ¼ Value of Exports in Sector p of CountryA=Quantity of Exports in Sector p of Country Að Þ
Value of EA 12 Exports in Sector p=Quantityof EA 12 Exports in Sector p :
The WRUV is the weighted average in value added of the RUV of these ﬁve sectors: as
it measures how many percentage points average export prices in these sectors differ
from average EA prices, it reveals to what extent a country adopted a high-quality
635 rather than a low-cost production strategy. As shown in Figure 4 D 6 5, the WRUV of
CMEs were typically higher at the beginning of the covered period and often further
increased, while the WRUV of MMEs were lower and mostly decreased over the
same period. It is necessary to take into account that the unit values do not only
Figure 4 Weighted relative unit value.
Source: De Ville and Vermeiren (2016).
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reﬂect quality but also cost. Hence, for those countries (i.e. the MMEs) where wages
640 (or other production costs) have been rising more than for other countries, the
WRUV at the end of the period likely overestimates the quality of their most impor-
tant export categories. The relatively high WRUV score of France and Italy compared
to the other MMEs can also be linked relatively good performance of their 5 RCA sec-
tors in terms quality-differentiation, which ignores the fact that the rest of their
645 export structure predominantly consists of homogenous production (see De Ville &
Vermeiren, 2016 for a more detailed analysis of the EA countries’ export structures).
It should be noted that unfavorable ULC dynamics in the MMEs offer an addi-
tional reason why traded sectors in these countries were affected by the euro’s appreci-
ation. While CME ﬁrms generally do not seem to have passed the appreciation onto
650 lower export prices because of their strong non-price competitiveness, price competi-
tiveness is more important for MME ﬁrms that produce goods with high price elastic-
ity. In this regard, Antoniades’ (2012) ﬁnding that the exchange rate pass-through on
export prices is relatively low in the EA – hence in both CMEs and MMEs – needs
to be understood against the background of rising ULC and decreasing proﬁt margins
655 for many MME ﬁrms: since the price competitiveness of these ﬁrms was weakened by
both an increase in ULC and a nominal euro appreciation, the low exchange rate
pass-through on export prices can be explained by the fact that ﬁrms had already
reduced their proﬁt margins in reaction to rising production costs and were therefore
unable or reluctant to reduce proﬁt margins even further in response to the nominal
660 euro appreciation.
ECB monetary policy and post-crisis trade rebalancing
Three main conclusions can be drawn from the preceding section. First, its effect on
ULC dynamics is mediated by differences in national wage setting institutions as well
as by ﬁscal policy and household credit regulations. Second, the effects of its monetary
665 policy on traded sectors’ investment spending and their share in total gross value added
follow D66 from their proﬁtability, which is shaped both by changes in production and
labor costs and their ability to protect mark-ups. Third, the ECB can play a key role in
the widening of extra-regional trade imbalances through the nominal exchange rate
channel and its varied effects on traded sectors in different VoC D67. The second and third
670 conclusions suggest that the divergence in non-price competitiveness was a central rea-
son why the ECB’s single monetary policy generally had beneﬁcial effects on traded sec-
tors in the CMEs yet harmful effects on those in the MMEs.
Trade rebalancing in the wake of the euro crisis has been highly asymmetrical (see
Table 8). Indeed, Figure 5 shows that the CMEs maintained their export-led growth
675 model, whereas the MMEs all shifted their growth orientation from consumption
Table 8. Elasticity of exports to REER and foreign demand (1994–2013).
REER Foreign demand REER Foreign demand
Austria ¡1.57 0.66 France ¡1.44 0.37
Belgium ¡0.4 0.73 Italy ¡2.56 1.18
Germany ¡0.81 1.18 Portugal ¡2.14 0.92
Netherlands ¡0.47 0.94 Spain ¡1.61 0.66
CME average ¡0.84 0.88 MME average ¡1.94 0.78
Source: European Commission (2014).Q26
Note: REER is based on export prices.
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towards exports in the wake of the euro crisis. In this brief section, I analyze the role of
the ECB’s monetary policy in the rebalancing process. Table 9 shows several indicators
of trade rebalancing and variables associated with its monetary policy transmission
mechanisms. Apart from Finland, the EA countries all improved their trade balance:
680 whereas the southern countries evaporated their deﬁcits, the CMEs sustained or even
increased their surpluses. Due to this asymmetrical trade rebalancing the EA’s aggre-
gate current account balance towards a surplus that reached 3.4% D68 of GDP in 2016.
Which role did the ECB play in this process?
One of the most salient developments since the eruption of the euro crisis has been
685 the sharp reduction in nominal ULC in the peripheral EA countries. The southern
MMEs were instructed to pursue an ‘internal devaluation’ of their ULC vis-a-vis those
in the northern EA countries by adopting austerity measures and labor market reforms
that led to a repression of wages. The ECB’s monetary policy played a key role in this
process. From the beginning of 2010 to the summer of 2012 the ECB’s reluctance to
690 directly support peripheral sovereign debt markets – based on an orthodox interpreta-
tion of the TFEU rules on the prohibition of monetary ﬁnancing – imposed austerity
on peripheral governments by pushing up their ﬁnancing costs. Moreover, ‘the ECB
hoped that market pressures would ﬁnally galvanize [peripheral governments] to
reform. That strategy… depended on the ECB’s resisting appeals to ease ﬁnancing con-
695 ditions for governments, which would otherwise let them off the reform ‘hook’’
(Henning, 2015Q24 D69, 6; see also Woodward, 2016Q25 ). ECB ofﬁcials believe that structural
reforms of labor markets are especially imperative in a monetary union as a way to
improve the transmission of monetary policy, as ‘they make economies more resilient
to economic shocks by facilitating price and wage ﬂexibility and the swift reallocation
700 of resources within and across sectors’ (Drahi, 2016Q27 ). As shown in Table 10 D70, restrictive
monetary conditions in the southern MMEs – as measured by annual growth of the
domestic money supply (M3) – are indeed associated with more restrictive ﬁscal
Figure 5 Average annual contribution of exports and consumption to GDP growth (2010–2015).
Source: AMECO.
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policy – measured by the percentage change in the cyclically D71adjusted primary govern-
ment balance – and a higher reform responsiveness – measured by the OECD’s index.
705 While highly restrictive monetary conditions helped to promote an internal devalua-
tion in ULC in the southern MMEs, highly expansionary conditions were less effective
in fueling higher wage inﬂation in the CMEs. A key reason why ULC failed to increase
stronger in the CMEs is that governments in these countries adopted ﬁscal consolida-
tion programs as well after 2010. Though the EU treaties – and the newly established
710 Fiscal Compact – compelled CME governments to reduce their public deﬁcits, restric-
tive ﬁscal policies also aimed to bolster the competitiveness of traded sector ﬁrms by
sharpening the incentives of wage restraint among trade unions (Carlin & Soskice,
2009; Iversen D72& Soskice, 2013). For this reason, traded sector ﬁrms in the CMEs do not
have to fear the inﬂationary effects of the ECB’s expansionary monetary policy on
715 unions’ wage demands as long as their government remains wedded to maintaining
their cost competiveness by committing themselves to a non-accommodating ﬁscal pol-
icy. Indeed, as shown in Table 10 D73, the CMEs have signiﬁcantly reduced their cyclically
adjusted primary balance between 2009 and 2015, despite the strong average annual
growth of the M3 during this period. Apart from restrictive ﬁscal policies, credit-miti-
720 gating regulatory frameworks prevented historically low long-term real interest rates
from translating into stronger domestic demand and wage growth. While housing mar-
kets have boomed since 2010 in most CMEs (especially in Austria and Germany), rising
housing prices depress rather than fuel debt-ﬁnanced consumption in countries like
Germany: ‘higher house prices at given incomes and given income growth expectations
725 are likely to reduce aggregate consumption: households with ambitions to become
owner-occupiers need to save harder for a housing down D74 payment. Renters can antici-
pate higher rents in future and are likely to be more cautious in their spending deci-
sions’ (Geiger, Muellbauer, & Rupprecht, 2014).
There are also other reasons why the ECB’s ability to foster wage-led rebalancing is
730 relatively constrained. In several southern MMEs product market reform is key to
allowing traded sectors in the southern MMEs to gain from the economy-wide internal
devaluation in ULC: there has been only limited incomplete pass-through of labor cost
restraint onto output prices in their traded and/or non-traded sectors, as the decline in
Table 9. Indicators of trade rebalancing and macroeconomic adjustment.
Change in trade balance
and its components
(2010–2015)
Change in nominal
Unit Wage Costs
(2010–2015)
Change in price
deﬂator (2010–
2015)
Exports Imports Balance Traded Non-traded Traded Non-traded
Change in
NEER (2009–2015)
CMEs
Austria 2.1 1.4 0.7 6.3 9.4 3.2 8.8 ¡3.6
Belgium 7.9 6.7 1.3 ¡5.4 7.1 ¡2.8 7.0 ¡4.2
Germany 4.5 2.2 2.4 5.6 9.0 6.4 7.3 ¡5.7
Finland ¡1.8 ¡0.3 ¡1.6 19.0 8.4 11.5 10.1 ¡5.2
Netherlands 10.5 8.1 2.4 3.7 0.5 2.1 2.3 ¡4.2
MMEs
France 4.0 3.5 0.5 ¡2.4 3.9 1.8 2.1 ¡5.1
Greece 9.8 1.0 8.8 ¡24.3 ¡12.6 4.9 ¡7.2 ¡0.1
Italy 4.8 0.0 4.9 5.0 2.5 3.8 3.7 ¡4.9
Portugal 10.7 2.4 8.3 ¡0.5 ¡4.1 1.0 1.2 ¡3.5
Spain 7.7 3.9 3.8 ¡13.1 ¡3.6 2.6 ¡1.4 ¡3.9
Source: OECD; AMECO.
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UWC was absorbed by an increase in proﬁt margins (Table 9 D75; see also European Com-
735 mission, 2013Q28 ). Because such incomplete pass-through of wage cuts into prices is only
consistent with rebalancing if it predominantly occurs in the tradable sectors, the lack
of competition and price cuts in the non-traded sectors inhibit a shift of resources away
from these sectors to the traded sectors (European Commission, 2013). This is consis-
tent with analyses that view the lack of competition-inducing product market liberal-
740 ization as a reﬂection of rent-seeking behavior of ﬁrms in the sheltered sectors
(Hopkin, 2015; Hassel, 2014). Furthermore, the ECB faces a trade-off between promot-
ing ULC-led internal devaluation in the southern MMEs and keeping ﬁnancing costs
for their traded sectors sufﬁciently low: while tightening monetary conditions encour-
aged a devaluation in ULC, they also raised their capital and funding costs. Therefore,
745 as even the European Commission (2013bQ29 , D76 23) had to acknowledge, rebalancing of
these countries not only required a reduction in ULC but also an improvement of fund-
ing conditions ‘in order to allow traded sector ﬁrms to offset the decline in domestic
markets by ﬁnding external ones, and, in a broader sense, to reallocate resources in the
tradable sector’. Financing conditions in these countries only improved after the ECB’s
750 announcement to engage in Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) in September
2012 and, especially, after the initiation of its Public Sector Purchase (PSP) program of
quantitative easing (QE) in January 2015.4
From an orthodox perspective, it might be argued that the ECB’s QE policies will
have longer-term detrimental consequences for the external competiveness of traded
755 sectors in the MMEs by alleviating pressure on their governments to pursue austerity
and pursue structural reforms. Yet, operational features of its PSP program have con-
strained the ability of EA governments to adopt more expansionary ﬁscal policies.5
Moreover, expectations about its imminent asset purchase programs during the second
triggered a signiﬁcant depreciation of the nominal exchange rate of the euro, which
760 was even more important to restoring the price competitiveness of traded sector ﬁrms
vis-a-vis non-Eurozone competitorsQ30 (see Figure 2 and Table 10D77).
It can be argued that the depreciation of the euro was a key transmission mechanism
through which the ECB was able to encourage trade rebalancing of the MMEs. As
shown in Figure 6D78, extra-regional merchandise exports of both CMEs and MMEs grew
765 much faster between 2008 and 2016 than intra-regional exports, which almost
Table 10. Monetary indicators, primary budget consolidation, and reform responsiveness.
Annual growth M3
(2008–2015)
Long-term real
interest rates
(2010–2015)
Primary budget
adjustment
(2010–2015)
Reform
responsiveness
index (2007–2014)
CMEs
Austria 2.87 0.5 3.31 0.38
Belgium 3.89 1.1 1.32 0.21
Finland 2.03 0.2 1.51 0.30
Germany 3.31 0.0 2.07 0.26
Netherlands 4.40 1.3 2.95 0.27
MMEs
France 1.96 1.4 2.67 0.32
Greece ¡5.68 13.1 10.14 0.61
Italy 0.92 3.0 3.19 0.33
Portugal ¡2.80 5.6 9.80 0.52
Spain 1.77 3.9 7.62 0.45
Source: National central banks; OECD; AMECO.
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stagnated for most EA countries as a result of the euro crisis and the ensuing austerity.
The nominal depreciation of the euro during this period played a central role in boost-
ing extra-regional exports. The depreciation of the euro, whose NEER fell by 16.7% D79
between October 2009 and August 2012 in the wake of the euro crisis – improved the
770 price competitiveness of southern EA producers vis-a-vis non-EA producers more than
the reduction in UCL, especially in light of the relatively low pass-through of ULC to
producer prices (Table 10). The importance of nominal exchange rate ﬂuctuations in
affecting the price competitiveness of the MMEs’ tradable sectors also reveals the vul-
nerability of adjustment strategies based on internal ULC D8 0devaluation: when the
775 NEER of the euro appreciated by more than 10% D8 1 from September 2012 to May
2014 as a result of the insurance devise offered by the ECB’s OMT pledge
(Figure 2), the effect of the reduction in ULC on their potential price competive-
ness vis-a-vis non-EA producers was nulliﬁed (Uxo, Paul, & Febrero, 2014). The
president of the ECB often expressed his concern about the nominal appreciation
780 of the euro during this period, which ‘affect[ed] external demand and reduce[d]
the competitiveness gains of price and cost adjustment in some [EA] countries’
(Draghi, 2014Q31 ).
Whether the ECB’s decision to engage in QE also implies the end of the appreciation
bias in its management of the nominal exchange rate of the euro remains to be seen: the
785 ECB was forced to resort to QE because of region-wide deﬂationary risks, which put
pressure on the ECB to adopt additional measures to fulﬁll its mandate of keeping inﬂa-
tion below but near 2% D82 (Steinberg D83& Vermeiren, 2016Q32 ). While the depreciation of the
euro following the announcement of the ECB’s asset purchase program aimed to sup-
port its mandate by raising import costs, the above analysis suggests that it was also an
790 effective in reallocating resources from the non-traded to the traded sectors in the
MMEs. In this respect, it is the ﬁrst time since the introduction of the euro that the
ECB’s monetary policy was generally favorable to their export-oriented interests. But it
is uncertain how long these exchange rate beneﬁts will last: the fact that euro
Figure 6 Growth in extra- and intra-EU exports between 2008 and 2016 (in percentage).
Source: Eurostat.
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appreciated again by almost 20% D84 during the ﬁrst half of 2017 suggests that the ECB’s
795 monetary policy strategy remains very vulnerable.
Conclusion
This D85paper examined the ECB’s role in the widening and asymmetrical readjustment of
EA trade imbalances by analyzing the effects of its monetary policies on the traded and
non-traded sectors in the 10 original continental EA countries. It set out to demonstrate
800 the added value of a CC approach that goes beyond the traditional focus on wage setting
institutions to understand the diverging monetary policy interests of these sectors. By
examining three separate monetary policy transmission mechanisms, I have argued that
divergences in non-price competiveness between the MMEs and the institutional sources
of these divergences are key to understanding how their traded sectors have been affected
805 by the ECB’s single monetary policy. The comparative specialization of CMEs in the pro-
duction of quality-differentiated price-inelastic goods explains the limited pass-through
of ULC changes into product prices in their traded sectors as well as why these sectors
remained largely unaffected by the huge nominal appreciation of the euro from 2002 to
2009. In the MMEs expansionary monetary conditions associated with the ECB’s single
810 interest rate combined with the absence of coordinated wage setting institutions to give
rise to economy-wide ULC inﬂation, which undermined the competitiveness of their
traded sectors in addition to the nominal appreciation of the euro and sapped foreign
demand for their price-elastic goods. The ECB’s monetary policy response to the euro
crisis were a boon for these sectors by fostering ULC deﬂation during the initial stages of
815 the crisis and contributing to the nominal euro depreciation in the wake of its asset pur-
chase programs. While domestic monetary conditions in the CMEs have been highly
expansionary since the eruption of the crisis, restrictive ﬁscal policies safeguarded the
cost competitiveness of their traded sectors by keeping ULC inﬂation at bay.
My analysis qualiﬁes the VoC literature’s view that coordinated wage bargaining
820 institutions are institutionally complementary to a non-accommodating monetary pol-
icy as they allow traded sector ﬁrms to maintain their price competitiveness by promot-
ing wage restraint. First, I have demonstrated that wage restraint and lower ULC in the
traded sectors do not necessarily translate into improved price competitiveness as trad-
able goods producers in CMEs tend to exploit the decline in labor costs to boost proﬁts
825 rather than lowering production prices. In this regard, it is questionable that a non-
accommodating monetary policy generates a positive feedback loop for the rest of the
domestic economy by bolstering the proﬁts of export-oriented ﬁrms: post-Keynesian
scholarship has shown that CMEs like Germany remain wage-led rather than proﬁt-led
economies, implying that wage restraint led to higher corporate proﬁts and income
830 inequality instead of boosting the domestic economy (Stockhammer & Onaran, 2012).
Second, expansionary monetary conditions in the CMEs do not inevitably fuel wage
inﬂation if their governments remain committed to export-led growth by pursuing
restrictive ﬁscal policies that inhibit domestic demand. D86Therefore, in contrast to the
VoC assumption that ﬁscal policy emulates monetary policy, expansionary monetary
835 conditions have been accompanied by austerity rather than ﬁscal stimulus programs:
the ECB’s expansionary monetary policy did not entice CME governments to imple-
ment expansionary ﬁscal policies to proﬁt as much as possible from the reduction in
real interest rates, which moved to negative territory since the start of its QE program.
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The literature therefore needs to pay more attention to the often conﬂicting interactions
840 between monetary and ﬁscal policy: an accommodating monetary policy alone is insuf-
ﬁcient to break the commitment of large trade unions to wage restraint in the CMEs if
ﬁscal policy remains restrictive.
Finally, the effectiveness of the ECB in fostering an asymmetrical adjustment of the
EA trade imbalances raises the question whether a monetary policy that prioritizes
845 traded sector over non-traded sectors interests in the entire region can be politically
sustainable. As Scharpf (2017)Q33 recently argued, the ECB is part of ‘a gigantic, and
indeed hubristic, gamble of technocratic social engineering whose visionary goal is the
creation of an integrated European economy that is ﬁt for competition in the ever more
contested global markets’ (2017D87, 23). Exports have become increasingly important driv-
850 ers of GDP growth in the MMEs, yet their share in the economy remains too small to
make the current recovery strategy politically legitimate, considering its destructive
impact on the domestic and sheltered sectors. While in the CMEs the ECB’s expansion-
ary response to the crisis did not clash with the interests of those sectors that play a cen-
tral role in their export-led growth model, it remains uncertain whether its loose
855 monetary policy can rely on sufﬁcient domestic societal support. By contributing to
ULC deﬂation in the MMEs as well as to the euro’s nominal depreciation, the ECB’s
monetary policy deﬂected deﬂationary pressures onto the rest of the world economy:
asymmetrical trade rebalances came at the expense of a rising trade surplus of the EA
vis-a-vis the rest of the world.
860 This points to an important contradiction in the ECB’s monetary policy strategy:
the Eurozone’s trade surplus puts upward pressure on the euro’s exchange rate – as
the euro’s appreciation during the ﬁrst half of 2017 testiﬁes. It also puts pressure on
governments of CMEs with huge trade surpluses like Germany to adopt more
expansionary ﬁscal policies. Indeed, the ECB has repeatedly insisted that these coun-
865 tries, whose politicians have criticized the historically low interest rates for expropri-
ating domestic savers, need to use the ﬁscal scope to boost domestic demand: taking
into account the ECB was forced to initiate a QE response to deal with the deﬂation-
ary consequences of austerity, the proclivity of CME governments to safeguard
traded sector interests clashed with the need to protect the interests of other key
870 domestic constituencies.Q34
Notes
1. While the Eurogroup (the EA’s minister of ﬁnances) is allowed to ‘conclude formal agreements on
an exchange rate system for the euro in relation to non-Community currencies’ and ‘formulate
general orientations for exchange rate policy’ (Article 219TFEU), its exchange rate instructions
875 may not undermine the ECB’s anti-inﬂation mandate. Therefore, the ECB retains de fact control
over the euro’s nominal exchange rate.
2. Germany’s ﬁscal deﬁcits breached the GSP’s 3 D88% ceiling in almost every year between 2001 and
2007.
3. Author’s calculation from the EU KLEMS Database.
880 4. Borrowing costs declined more in peripheral countries (113 basis points) than in core countries
(50 basis points) after the ECB announced its credit easing package in June 2014 (ECB 2015).
5. First, 80D89% of the asset purchases have to remain on the balance sheet of the national central bank,
exposing governments to any default risk ensuing from their own ﬁscal policies. Second, the ECB’s
Governing Council decided to put in place an absolute limit the Eurosystem can buy on secondary
885 sovereign bond markets: it can only hold a maximum of 25D90% of a single eligible security’s available
issues (later extended to 33D91%) and only 33D92% of a government’s outstanding securities. These features
of the ECB’s QE program might help explain why the structural budget balance of the MMEs con-
tinue to improve or remain stable after 2015 according to IMF estimations.
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